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Coupling Chaotic System Based on Unit Transform and Its Appli-
cations in Image Encryption
Guozhen Hu, Baobin Li
• A novel chaotic system named UT-CCS is proposed as a general frame-
work which has covered several existing chaotification models. The
proposed UT-CCS combines two chaotic maps to generate a new one
with excellent performance. A feasible way on how to select UTFs in
UT-CCS to generate preferable chaotic maps is discussed.
• A new chaos-based pseudo random number generator (CBPRNG) with
good randomness is proposed. The uniformity of proposed CBPRNG
is proved theoretically.
• A novel digital image encryption algorithm based on CBPRNG is de-
signed and tested.
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Abstract
Chaotic maps are very important for establishing chaos-based image encryp-
tion systems. This paper introduces a coupling chaotic system based on a
certain unit transform, which can combine any two 1D chaotic maps to gener-
ate a new one with excellent performance. The chaotic behavior analysis has
verified this coupling systems effectiveness and progress. In particular, we
give a specific strategy about selecting an appropriate unit transform func-
tion to enhance chaos of generated maps. Besides, a new chaos based pseudo-
random number generator, shorted as CBPRNG, is designed to improve the
distribution of chaotic sequences. We give a mathematical illustration on the
uniformity of CBPRNG, and test the randomness of it. Moreover, based on
CBPRNG, an image encryption algorithm is introduced. Simulation results
and security analysis indicate that the proposed image encryption scheme is
competitive with some advanced existing methods.
Keywords: Chaotic system, Random number generator, Image encryption,
Confusion-diffusion, Security analysis
1. Introduction
With the rapid development of the Internet and communication technolo-
gies, especially the great expansion of transmission bandwidth, multimedia
data mainly consisting of digital images, audios and videos, has taken a large
proportion of information exchanged on the Internet. More and more peo-
ple choose to communicate with each other through multimedia information
instead of classical text messages due to its intuition and vividness. Wide
applications of multimedia communication bring great convenience to peo-
ple’s daily life. In the meantime, a series of problems also arise in obtaining,
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transmitting, processing and storing the multimedia data. One of the most
serious problems among these issues is the data security during the transmis-
sion on common channels, because those multimedia data includes personal
privacy, trade secret and even military secret. The examples of huge losses
caused by data leakage are not rare, thus, it needs to be protected carefully
against potential attackers [1, 2, 3, 4].
Considering that videos are essentially composed of sequential image
frames, the image information security on which this paper focused, is one of
the main branches of multimedia information security. A straightforward ap-
proach to protect digital images in transmission is image encryption. That is,
the sender encrypts the image into a meaningless cipher, typically a noise-like
image, and the receiver decrypts the ciphertext image to recover the origi-
nal image using pre-negotiated keys. According to the kerckhoffs principle
[5], the security of this cryptosystem shouldn’t depend on keeping secret for
encrypting scheme, but secret keys only. Thus, it is often difficult to design
an image encryption algorithm with excellent performance as attackers will
know every details of your method.
From the perspective of computer storage and communication, the image
data has no difference from text information, as they are all represented by
binary bit streams. Therefore, traditional text encryption algorithms such
as Data Encryption Standard [6], are applicable for digital image encryption.
However, this way brings low efficiency and poor safety because image data
has its own characteristics such as high correlation among adjacent pixels,
lager amount of data and high redundancy. Over the years, a number of
algorithms designed for image data encryption have been proposed [1, 2, 3,
4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Among these algorithms, the chaos based methods in
[1, 2, 9, 11, 12], attract growing attentions from researchers owing to the good
nature of chaotic system. A dynamical system is said to be chaotic when
it is sensitive to initial value, aperiodic and non-convergence [13]. These
characteristics make the chaotic system meet all the needs for encryption
[14].
In today’s image encryption fields, it is no exaggeration to say that most
image encryption algorithms are designed based on chaotic maps. A typical
way is to set the chaotic map as a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG).
As a result, the security of these encryption methods depends largely on the
performance of their underlying chaotic maps. The existing chaotic maps
with excellent performance (e.g. the Lorenz system and Chen system) are
often relatively sophisticated, which increases the complexity of encryption
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process. Researchers tend to adapt simple 1D chaotic maps such as Logistic
map to achieve high efficiency. However, these simple systems have some
drawbacks which may cause security hazards to encryption process. Firstly,
most of them have a narrow and discontinuous chaotic range on their con-
trol parameter that is often served as a secret key in encryption. It means
that the key space is limited, which makes the cryptosystem vulnerable to be
attacked. Secondly, some chaotic maps are quite sensitive to the finite preci-
sion effect of computer and may degrade to non-chaotic immediately. Besides,
the chaotic sequences generated by iterating the chaotic maps, usually have
a non-uniform distribution, which reduces the randomness of cipher.
To address above problems, researchers have proposed a series of new
chaotic systems by modifying and combining existing chaotic maps. For ex-
ample, Zhang constructed the mixed linearnonlinear coupled map lattices to
gain outstanding cryptography features in dynamics [15]. Zhou proposed a
parametric switching chaotic system by combining three common 1D chaotic
maps to enhance complexity [16]. A homogenized Chebyshev-Arnold map
was discussed by Luo in [17], which greatly improved the chaotic behavior
of the original Chebyshev map. Hua and Zhou combined two 1D chaotic
maps to construct a 2D chaotic system with superior chaotic property for
image encryption and improved multiple versions [18, 19, 20]. Zahmoul pro-
posed a new Beta-function-base chaotic map for image encryption with high
efficiency [21]. Hua modified the chaotic sine map to improve the chaotic be-
havior and achieved amazing results [22]. Gayathri proposed spatiotemporal
mixed linearnonlinear coupling with the logistic-sine system for chaotic orbit
generation [23]. All these work has proved the feasibility of chaos modifica-
tion and laid a solid foundation for chaos application in image enryption.
As aforementioned, each case enumerated above developed a specific
chaotic map with clear definition. Recently, some researchers are not content
with improving concrete chaotic maps manually. Instead, they tend to build
a general framework which could process arbitrary existing chaotic maps and
generate new chaotic maps with excellent performance automatically. In this
way, a number of new chaotic maps could be easily get for image encryption
when we set different existing chaotic maps as seed maps. Up to now, several
chaotic systems of this kind have been proposed. Zhou proposed a new 1D
chaotic system by simply adding two existing maps followed by a modulo
operation [24]. Hua did further research on Zhou’s method and improved it
by transforming the sum of two chaotic maps through a cosine function to
enhance nonlinearity [9]. Asgari-Chenaghlu proposed a polynomial chaotic
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system to bind any number of seed chaotic maps by polynomial coupling
and achieved complex chaotic behavior [23]. Alawida developed a new hy-
brid digital chaotic system by the composition of two chaotic maps as well
as modulo operation [25]. Parvaz also combined different chaotic maps by
composition and proposed a combination chaotic system using lots of pa-
rameters to improve performance [26]. Lan proposed an integrated chaotic
system by mixing three existing maps with addition, composition, and mod-
ulo operation [27]. The research regarding chaotic frameworks is becoming a
hotspot.
Although some chaotic frameworks which can generate new chaotic maps
from existing seed maps have been proposed, they still have some defects that
need to be improved. At first, many existing methods introduce parameters
into their frameworks, but they cannot point out how these parameters will
affect the generated chaotic maps. This makes the frameworks difficult to use,
as users don’t know how to set parameters properly. Next, the universality of
some proposed chaotic systems is not good. That is, the generated new maps
are of poor chaotic property when changing seed maps from given examples.
Additionally, the uneven distribution of chaotic sequences gained by iterating
chaotic maps are still unresolved thoroughly in most methods. At last, the
chaotic behavior of some generated chaotic maps are not complex enough
when applied in cryptography fields.
According to the analysis above, this work proposes a coupling chaotic
system based on unit transform, named as UT-CCS, to address these prob-
lems. UT-CCS has a simple form and can combine any two 1D maps to
gain a new chaotic map with excellent performance, with the aid of an unit
transform function(UTF). And in this chaotic framworks, the UTF plays
an important role, and has a great influence on the behavior of generated
chaotic maps. Thus, we give a specific guidance on how to select an appro-
priate UTF to enhance chaos of generated maps in UT-CCS. Based on this
strategy, some new chotic maps have been constructed, and perform better
chotic behaviors than some konwn cases in terms of Lyapunov exponent and
sample entropy. Besides, we design a new PRNG based on three superior
chaotic maps generated by UT-CCS for image encryption. The chaos based
PRNG (CBPRNG) greatly improves the numerical distribution of chaotic se-
quence and the uniformity of CBPRNG is proved theoretically in this paper.
At last, a digital image encryption algorithm based on proposed CBPRNG
is developed as an application of UT-CCS. Some general tests for security
analysis demonstrate the high security of our image encryption scheme and
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the progress compared to existing works.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
structure of UT-CCS, and analyzes the selection strategy of UTF. Moreover,
a series of new chaotic maps are generated as examples. The performance of
generated chaotic maps will be tested in Section 3, which is also compared
with other chaotic systems. Section 4 introduces, discusses, and evaluates the
CBPRNG, which will be used to establish a new image encryption algorithm
in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the security through several tests and the
results are compared with a number of existing methods, while Section 7
concludes this paper.
2. A new chaotic framework: UT-CCS
In this section, a coupling chaotic system based on unit transform, shorted
as UT-CCS, is proposed and described in details. To test the performance of
the system, several new chaotic maps are generated as examples using three
existing chaotic maps. Besides, a feasible way on how to select an appropriate
UTF is discussed.
2.1. Structure of UT-CCS
To build the structure of UT-CCS, we first introduce the concept of unit
transform function(UTF) . A function f is named a unit transform function
if it satisfying
f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
That is, A UTF is a function which maps unit interval [0, 1] to itself.
 
Figure 1: The structure of proposed chaotic system
For a unit transform function f(x), the structure of UT-CCS is depicted
in Figure 1, which is defined as following:
xn+1 = f((F1(r, xn) + F2(1− r, xn)) mod 1), (1)
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where F1 and F2 are two 1D chaotic maps (seed maps), r and 1− r are their
normalized control parameters and r ∈ [0, 1], and n is the iteration number.
In this proposed chaotic systeym, two 1D chaotic maps are coupled by their
normalized control parameter at first, which will mix the chaotic behaviors of
these two seed maps, and effectively expand the chaotic range of parameter
r. Then, modulo operation is performed to ensure the output value is in
[0, 1]. At last, a UTF f(x) is used to further increase the complexity and
nonlinearity of chaotic system.
In the above chaotic framwork, different seed maps and unit transforms
functions will produce various chaotic maps with different behaviors. Since
the seed maps F1, F2 in Eq.(1) can be set as any existing chaotic maps, users
can easily generate customized chaotic maps to meet various needs. Besides,
selecting different functions as UTF can also improve the performance of
generated chaotic maps. Even for the same seed maps, when setting different
UTFs in our proposed UT-CCS, the behaviors of generated chaotic systems
change dramatically, which will be illustrated in the following section. And
an effective guidance on how to choose a proper UTF will be also offered
later in this paper.
Actually, the UT-CCS is proposed as an unified chaotic framework which
has covered several existing chaotification models. For example, when we
choose the UTF as f(x) = x, then UT-CCS becomes the combined chaotic
system proposed by Zhou et al. in [24]; when setting f(x) = sin(pix), it is
identified with the STBCS proposed by Hua et al. in [28]; when f(x) =
cos(pix) , the CTBCS proposed in [9] has the similar structure of UT-CCS.
In this regard, our work is of great generality.
2.2. Some Examples of UT-CCS
As examples, we select three common 1D chaotic maps as seed maps.
The definitions of three seed maps with their parameters normalized are
listed below:
1) Logistic map:
xn+1 = 4rxn(1− xn), (2)
2) Tent map:
xn+1 =
{
2rxn, xn ∈ [0, 0.5),
2r(1− xn), xn ∈ [0.5, 1],
(3)
3) Sine map:
xn+1 = r sin(pixn). (4)
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In Eq.(2) - (4), r is the normalized control parameter of chaotic maps, where
r ∈ [0, 1]. Besides, it can be trivially proved that these three maps always get
outputs in [0, 1] if inputs are in [0, 1], which means the modulo 1 operation
can be omitted when they are set as seed maps of the proposed UT-CCS.
Set any two of these maps as seed maps, then there are three combinations
of coupling, naming Logistic-Sine coupling map(LSCM), Tent-Logistic cou-
pling map(TLCM) and Sine-Tent coupling map(STCM). They are formally
defined as Eq.(5):
LSCM : xn+1 = 4rxn(1− xn) + (1− r) sin(pixn),
TLCM : xn+1 =
{
2rxn + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn), xn ∈ [0, 0.5),
2r(1− xn) + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn), xn ∈ [0.5, 1],
STCM : xn+1 =
{
r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)xn, xn ∈ [0, 0.5),
r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)(1− xn), xn ∈ [0.5, 1].
(5)
The last step of UT-CCS is to select an appropriate UTF f(x). For the
sake of simplicity, now we consider five basic elementary functions (BEFs)
as f(x) respectively, then we can get 15 new chaotic maps totally. Note that
f(x) should be defined properly on unit interval [0,1]. The definitions of
these new chaotic maps based on LSCM, TLCM, and STCM are listed as
Table 1 - 3, respectively.
Table 1: Definitions of five new chaotic maps based on LSCM
f(x) corresponding LSCM
f(x) = x xn+1 = 4rxn(1− xn) + (1− r) sin(pixn)
f(x) = 2x − 1 xn+1 = 24rxn(1−xn)+(1−r) sin(pixn) − 1
f(x) = ln(1+x)
ln 2
xn+1 =
ln(1+4rxn(1−xn)+(1−r) sin(pixn))
ln 2
f(x) = sin(pix) xn+1 = sin(pi(4rxn(1− xn) + (1− r) sin(pixn)))
f(x) = 2
pi
arcsinx xn+1 =
2
pi
arcsin(4rxn(1− xn) + (1− r) sin(pixn))
2.3. Selecting strategy of UTFs
In above examples, the cases for f(x) = x, sin(pix), have been discussed
in [24] and [28], respectively, which also show that different UTFs will bring
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Table 2: Definitions of five new chaotic maps based on TLCM
f(x) corresponding TLCM
f(x) = x xn+1 =
{
2rxn + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn), xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
2r(1− xn) + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn), xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) = 2x − 1 xn+1 =
{
22rxn+4(1−r)xn(1−xn) − 1, xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
22r(1−xn)+4(1−r)xn(1−xn) − 1, xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) =
ln(1+x)
ln 2
xn+1 =

ln(1 + 2rxn + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn))
ln 2
, xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
ln(1 + 2r(1− xn) + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn))
ln 2
, xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) = sin(pix) xn+1 =
{
sin(pi(2rxn + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn))), xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
sin(pi(2r(1− xn) + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn))), xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) = 2
pi
arcsinx xn+1 =

2
pi
arcsin(2rxn + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn)), xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
2
pi
arcsin(2r(1− xn) + 4(1− r)xn(1− xn)), xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
Table 3: Definitions of five new chaotic maps based on STCM
f(x) corresponding TLCM
f(x) = x xn+1 =
{
r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)xn, xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)(1− xn), xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) = 2x − 1 xn+1 =
{
2r sin(pix)+2(1−r)xn − 1, xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
2r sin(pix)+2(1−r)(1−xn) − 1, xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) =
ln(1+x)
ln 2
xn+1 =

ln(1 + r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)xn)
ln 2
, xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
ln(1 + r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)(1− xn))
ln 2
, xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) = sin(pix) xn+1 =
{
sin(pi(r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)xn)), xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
sin(pi(r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)(1− xn))), xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
f(x) = 2
pi
arcsinx xn+1 =

2
pi
arcsin(r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)xn), xn ∈ [0, 0.5)
2
pi
arcsin(r sin(pix) + 2(1− r)(1− xn)), xn ∈ [0.5, 1]
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distinct chaotic systems. Thus, how to select an appropriate UTF f(x) is an
important issue in our UT-CCS. Here are some basic principles:
1) f(x) should be a surjection on unit interval [0,1], otherwise the system
may degrade into non-chaotic with iteration.
2) f(x) should expand the chaotic range of parameter r. The new map is
chaotic for all r ∈ [0, 1] is the best.
3) f(x) should make the new map exhibit more complex chaotic behaviors
than its underlying seed maps.
4) f(x) should be as simple as possible so that chaotic sequence could be
generated efficiently on computers.
As we can see above, 1) and 4) are easy to meet while satisfying 2) and 3)
need to do experiments on a number of potential f(x).
In order to get more specific guides on selecting f(x), we analyze the
UT-CCS in terms of Lyapunov exponent (LE) [29], which is widely used
to measure the chaotic level of a dynamical system. Suppose a dynamical
system is defined by xn+1 = F (xn), where F (x) is piecewise differentiable,
then LE of the system is defined as:
λF = lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
ln |F ′(xi)|. (6)
Generally, a positive LE demonstrates chaos of the system. Larger LE indi-
cates faster diverging rate of two close trajectories, that is, the more complex
chaotic behaviors of the system. Therefore, the UTF f(x) should be chosen
to get large LE of the new chaotic map. Accordingly, a theorem regarding
the selection of f(x) is given below.
Theorem 1. Let F1, F2 be two chaotic maps generated by UT-CCS using
the same seed maps, f1, f2 are their corresponding piecewise differentiable
UTFs respectively. Then
λF1 > λF2 ,
if
∀x ∈ [0, 1], |f ′1(x)| > |f ′2(x)|,
where λFi denotes the Lyapunov exponent of Fi, i = 1, 2.
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Proof. Suppose h(x), g(x) are two seed maps. Denote
σ(x) = (h(r, x) + g(1− r, x)) mod 1,
then F1(x) = f1(σ(x)), F2(x) = f2(σ(x)). Considering σ(x) ∈ [0, 1], from the
condition of Theorem 1, it is easy to get
∀x ∈ [0, 1], |df1
dσ
| > |df2
dσ
|
⇒ ln |df1
dσ
|+ ln |dσ
dx
| > ln |df2
dσ
|+ ln |dσ
dx
|
⇒∀x ∈ [0, 1], ln |F ′1(x)| > ln |F ′2(x)|
⇒ lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
ln |F ′1(xi)| > lim
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
ln |F ′2(xi)|
⇒λF1 > λF2
According to Theorem 1, the larger |f ′(x)| brings larger LE of the new
chaotic map. Thus, we can choose UTF f(x) with greater |f ′(x)| on [0, 1] to
improve the chaotic behavior of UT-CCS. In this way, an appropriate f(x)
is expected to be found easily.
Based on Theorem 1, we construct another three UTFs defined as follow-
ing to generate preferable chaotic maps:
I: |f ′(x)| ≡ 2:
f(x) =
{
2x, x ∈ [0, 0.5),
−2x+ 2, x ∈ [0.5, 1], (7)
II: |f ′(x)| ≡ 4:
f(x) =

4x, x ∈ [0, 0.25),
−4x+ 2, x ∈ [0.25, 0.5),
4x− 2, x ∈ [0.5, 0.75),
−4x+ 4, x ∈ [0.75, 1],
(8)
10
III: |f ′(x)| ≡ 8:
f(x) =

8x, x ∈ [0, 0.125),
−8x+ 2, x ∈ [0.125, 0.25),
8x− 2, x ∈ [0.25, 0.375),
−8x+ 4, x ∈ [0.375, 0.5),
8x− 4, x ∈ [0.5, 0.625),
−8x+ 6, x ∈ [0.625, 0.75),
8x− 6, x ∈ [0.75, 0.875),
−8x+ 8, x ∈ [0.875, 1].
(9)
For above three UTFs and three coupling maps—LSCM, TLCM, STCM,
we can get another 9 new chaotic maps, which can be classified into three
types according to which UTF above is used,
Type I: LSCM-I, TLCM-I, STCM-I;
Type II: LSCM-II, TLCM-II, STCM-II;
Type III: LSCM-III, TLCM-III, STCM-III.
That is, the generated chaotic maps LSCM-I, TLCM-I, and STCM-I that
based on the first UTF (Eq.(7)) are collectively called type-I coupling chaotic
maps, and so on. The spceific mathematical definitions of these new maps
are omitted.
3. Performance analysis of generated chaotic maps
In this section, we analyze the chaotic behaviors of the generated chaotic
maps in Section 2.2 - 2.3 to demonstrate the effectiveness of UT-CCS. Since
the type-III coupling chaotic maps are expected to gain the best performance,
we will focus on them in all test items. We evaluate chaotic maps in terms of
Lyapunov exponent (LE), bifurcation diagram (BD), cobweb diagram, and
sample entropy (SE). The results are also compared with Zhou’s method [24],
Hua’s CTBCS [9], and the underlying seed maps.
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3.1. Lyapunov exponent
The definition and implication of LE have been introduced in Section 2.3.
Figure 2 has shown the LEs of three seed maps with the change of normalized
parameter r. Figure 3 illustrates the results of the 15 new chaotic maps
where five BEFs are selected as UTFs. As we can see, the LEs of Logistic
map and Sine map are positive only for some r ∈ [0.89, 1], and the LE of
Tent map is positive only when r > 0.5. That is, all the three seed maps
have a narrow and discontinuous chaotic range. Figure 3 shows that the 15
new chaotic maps have positive LEs for all r ∈ [0, 1], indicating that all the
generated chaotic maps are superior than their underlying seed maps, which
also illustrates that our UT-CCS is effective.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
r
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
LE
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
r
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
LE
(b)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
r
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
LE
(c)
Figure 2: Lyapunov exponents of three seed maps: (a) Logistic map; (b) Tent map; (c)
Sine map.
The LEs of new chaotic maps based on Eq.(7)-(9) are shown in Figure 4.
The results of Zhou’s method [24] and Hua’s method [9] using the same seed
maps are illustrated as comparison. As we can see, all the generated type-
I, type-II, and type-III coupling maps are chaotic for all r ∈ [0, 1] and their
LEs are lager than Zhou’s method. Also, the type-I with LSCM, TLCM, and
STCM have LEs close to Hua’s method while the LEs of type-II and type-III
coupling maps are far larger than Hua’s method. Because larger LE indicates
more complex chaotic behavior, our UT-CCS is of the best performance.
Most importantly, Figure 4 also tells us that all the type-II chaotic maps
have larger LEs than type-I and all the type-III chaotic maps have larger
LEs than type-II, which demonstrates the correctness of Theorem 1. Thus,
we can even get new chaotic maps with further larger LEs by constructing
proper f(x).
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(c)
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LE
LSCM
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0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.7
LE
LSCM
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(e)
Figure 3: Lyapunov exponents of new chaotic maps based on five BEFs: (a) Power func-
tion; (b) Exponential function; (c) Logarithmic function; (d) Trigonometric function; (e)
Inverse trigonometric function.
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(b)
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Figure 4: Comparison of LEs between different generated chaotic maps based on same
seed maps: (a) LSCM; (b) TLCM; (c) STCM.
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3.2. Bifurcation diagram
Bifurcation diagram presents the distribution of points in different trajec-
tories of a dynamic system visually with the change of parameter. According
to the ergodicity of visited points of an orbit, we will know whether the sys-
tem is chaotic. The BDs of type-III coupling maps as well as three seed maps
are shown in Figure 5, where the initial value is set as x0 = 0.1. It follows
that the seed maps are non-chaotic for most r ∈ [0, 1], since most orbits are
fixed or periodic. However, the points of all type-III coupling maps fill the
whole phase plane, suggesting the strong chaotic behaviors for all r ∈ [0, 1].
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 5: Bifurcation diagrams of different chaotic maps: (a) Logistic map; (b) Tent map;
(c) Sine map; (d) LSCM-III; (e) TLCM-III; (f) STCM-III.
3.3. Cobweb diagram
Cobweb diagram is a plotting scheme developed to present the behavior
of 1D recursions intuitively. Suppose a recursion is defined by xn+1 = F (xn),
then the cobweb diagram can be gained by following steps:
Step 1. Plot the diagonal line y = x and the graph of y = F (x).
Step 2. Plot the vertical line segment from (xi, xi) to (xi, xi+1).
Step 3. Plot the horizontal line segment from (xi, xi+1) to (xi+1, xi+1).
14
Step 4. Repeat Step 2 and 3 with iteration.
Generally, there are three results for any recursion after long-run iteration:
converging to a fixed point, being cyclic, and reaching chaotic. Correspond-
ingly, the cobweb plot will show inward square spiral, fixed track, and largely
filled plane, respectively. Figure 6 has illustrated the Cobweb plots of three
type-III coupling maps and their seed maps with parameter r = 0.8. It can
be seen easily that all the generated coupling maps are chaotic while Logistic
map and Sine map degrade into cyclic. The Tent map is chaotic when r = 0.8
but it can’t traverse [0, 1] with iteration.
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Figure 6: Cobweb diagrams of different chaotic maps: (a) Logistic map; (b) Tent map; (c)
Sine map; (d) LSCM-III; (e) TLCM-III; (f) STCM-III.
3.4. Sample entropy
Sample entropy is an improved version of approximate entropy, both of
which give a quantitative measurement of the complexity of a time series
[30]. The definition and computing method of SE can refer to [9]. Actually,
SE describes the probability of emergence of new schema in time series. A
series is considered to be more complex if new schema is more likely to
appear. Therefore, a larger SE value indicates a more disordered series. We
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Figure 7: Comparison of LEs between different generated chaotic maps based on same
seed maps: (a) LSCM; (b) TLCM; (c) STCM.
have calculated the SEs of different sequences obtained by iterating various
chaotic maps with the initial value x0 = 0.1. The results are shown in
Figure 7. Coinciding with Lyapunov exponents, the type-III chaotic maps
get largest SEs among tested chaotic maps including Zhou’s method, Hua’s
CTBCS, type-I and type-II coupling maps, and underlying seed maps. This
results demonstrate the good performance of UT-CCS.
4. CBPRNG for image encryption
In this section, a new PRNG based on proposed UT-CCS is designed for
image encryption. It has been shown in Section 3 that the generated chaotic
maps have excellent performance, thus the chaotic sequences gained by it-
erating chaotic maps already have many properties that an eligible pseudo-
random number sequence (PRNS) should have, such as high sensitivity to
initial value, aperiodicity, non-convergence, and unpredictability. The only
problem left is that the numerical distribution of chaotic sequences are some-
times uneven. As can be seen in Figure 5(d)-5(f), the generated chaotic
sequences from type-III coupling maps gather around 0 for some r. This
non-uniform distribution reduces the randomness greatly, which causes inse-
curity in encryption. Hence, it is inappropriate to set the coupling chaotic
maps as PRNGs directly. To address this problem, we propose the following
CBPRNG.
4.1. Structure of proposed CBPRNG
Figure 8 illustrates the structure of k-bit CBPRNG, where k is usually set
as 32 or 64 in modern computer system. xn+1 = F (r, xn) is one of the three
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 Figure 8: The structure of k-bit CBPRNG
type-III coupling chaotic maps. yn+1 = (ayn+b) mod m is the classical linear
congruential generator (LCG), where we set a = 1103515245, b = 12345,
m = 231 to get good performance [31]. Elements in two sequence xn, yn
are converted into k-bit integers pn, qn. Note that xn ∈ [0, 1] while yn ∈ N.
The operation floor denotes the rounding down function which transforms
a floating point number r to the maximum integer no greater than r. At
last, the corresponding elements in two sequences pn, qn perform a bitwise
XOR operation (denoted by ⊗) to get the final PRNS zn. The initial value
of chaotic map is x0 while that of LCG is floor(x0 ·m), where x0 ∈ (0, 1).
4.2. Discussion on the uniformity of CBPRNG
Now we attempt to analyze the numerical distribution of generated PRNS
zn theoretically. To achieve this, we give some simple theorems at first.
Theorem 2. Suppose X is a discrete random variable ranging on {0, 1, 2, · · · ,
2k − 1}, Xk−1Xk−2 · · ·X1X0 is the binary representation of X. Then X has
a uniform distribution if and only if each bit Xi(i = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1) in the
binary form has a 0-1 uniform distribution, i.e.
P {X = 0} = P {X = 1} = · · · = P {X = 2k − 1} = 1
2k
⇐⇒∀ i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , k − 1} , P {Xi = 0} = P {Xi = 1} = 1
2
(10)
Proof. 1) Sufficiency: ∀ x ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 2k − 1}, let xk−1xk−2 · · ·x1x0 rep-
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resent the binary form of x. Then
P {X = x} = P {Xk−1 = xk−1, Xk−1 = xk−1, · · · , X0 = x0}
= P {Xk−1 = xk−1} · P {Xk−2 = xk−2} · · ·P {X0 = x0}
=
1
2
· 1
2
· · · 1
2
=
1
2k
2) Necessity: ∀ i ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , k − 1}, we have
P {Xi = 0} =
∑
P {X = Xk−1 · · ·Xi+10Xi−1 · · ·X0}
where
∑
denotes summing probabilities of all possible values of Xk−1 · · ·Xi+1
Xi−1 · · ·X0. Apparently there are 2k−1 combinations of values totally. Con-
sidering the condition P {X = 0} = P {X = 1} = · · · = P {X = 2k − 1} =
1/2k, we know that the probability of every combination is 1/2k. Therefore
we have
P {Xi = 0} = 2k−1 · 1
2k
=
1
2
The same procedure can be easily adapted to Xi = 1, thus we finally get
P {Xi = 0} = P {Xi = 1} = 1
2
Theorem 3. Suppose ξ, η are two independent 0-1 binary random variables.
Random variable τ = ξ ⊗ η, where ⊗ denotes exclusive or operation. Then
τ has a 0-1 uniform distribution if either of ξ and η has a 0-1 uniform
distribution.
Proof. We may suppose ξ has a 0-1 uniform distribution, i.e. P {ξ = 0} =
P {ξ = 1} = 1/2. The distributed of η is represented as P {η = 0} = p,
P {η = 1} = 1− p. Then we have
P {τ = 0} = P {ξ = 0, η = 0}+ P {ξ = 1, η = 1}
= P {ξ = 0} · P {η = 0}+ P {ξ = 1} · P {η = 1}
=
1
2
· p+ 1
2
· (1− p)
=
1
2
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Similarly, we can get P {τ = 1} = 1/2. Therefore, τ has a 0-1 uniform
distribution.
Based on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, it is easy to prove that the output
zn generated by CBPRNG has a uniform distribution. At first, it is well-
known that LCG can produce evenly distributed sequence. That is, qn has
a uniform distribution on
{
0, 1, 2, · · · , 2k − 1}. Then, from Theorem 2, we
know that each bit qin (i = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1) in the binary form of qn has a
0-1 uniform distribution. Because zn = pn⊗ qn, where ⊗ denotes the bitwise
XOR operation, we get each bit zin of zn has a 0-1 uniform distribution by
Theorem 3. At last, we conclude that zn has a uniform distribution on{
0, 1, 2, · · · , 2k − 1} form the necessity of Theorem 2 and the proof is done.
4.3. Randomness tests of CBPRNG
PRNG have been studied for many years, along with which a mature eval-
uation system is established. Here, we employ two widely used randomness
test suites to examine the performance of CBPRNG.
4.3.1. TestU01
Implemented by C language, TestU01 offers a collection of utilities for the
empirical randomness testing of PRNGs [32]. In our experiment, we use two
predefined test batteries, Rabbit and Alphabit to evaluate the randomness
of bit sequences generated by CBPRNG. As a comparison, the bit sequences
directly gained by iterating chaotic maps also participate in the test. The
Rabbit test battery includes 38 subtests for bit sequences of length 220 while
the Alphabit test battery includes 17 subtests.
Table 4 gives the TestU01 results for bit sequences generated by dif-
ferent PRNGs. It can be seen that the random sequences directly gained
from type-III coupling chaotic maps—LSCM-III,TLCM-III, STCM-III, fail
many subtests. However, the bit sequences produced by CBPRNG: LSCM-
LCG,TLCM-LCG and STCM-LCG, pass all subtests of Rabbit battery and
Alphabit battery, which has proved the strong randomness of proposed CB-
PRNG.
4.3.2. NIST SP800-22 test
The NIST SP800-22 test standard [33] is designed by National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) to measure the randomness of binary
sequences, which is especially used in the field of cryptography. This test
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Table 4: TestU01 results
PRNGs Rabbit Alphabit
LSCM-III 11/38 4/17
LSCM-LCG 38/38 17/17
TLCM-III 12/38 6/17
TLCM-LCG 38/38 17/17
STCM-III 15/38 7/17
STCM-LCG 38/38 17/17
standard has 15 subtests totally and each of them outputs a P-value. A
random sequence is thought to pass a subtest if the corresponding P-value
is greater than 0.01. As recommended in [33], at least 55 sequences should
be tested and there are two approaches to interpret the empirical results of
multiple test sequences. One is examining the proportion of sequences that
pass a subtest. The other is checking the uniform distribution of P-value for
different test sequences to ensure uniformity.
In this experiment, we test 100 binary sequences for every PRNG. The
length of each sequence is 1000000 bits. Similarly, we also test the chaotic se-
quences directly gained by iterating three type-III coupling maps to compare
the results with our proposed CBPRNG. According to [33], the minimum
pass rate for each subtest with the exception of the random excursion (vari-
ant) test is 96 for 100 test sequences. Besides, a χ2 test is suggested to
evaluate the uniformity of P-value for 100 test sequences in an arbitrary
subtest, which outputs a P-valueT as a result. And the sequences can be
considered to be uniformly distributed if P-valueT > 0.0001.
Table 5 lists the proportion of 100 test sequences that pass a subtest for
different PRNGs. The pass rate of proposed CBPRNG in all subtests are high
enough to meet minimum requirements. However, the pass rate of type-III
coupling chaotic maps are relatively low, and even none of 100 test sequences
can pass in some subtests. Therefore, the CBPRNG can generate sequences
of better randomness. When applying to image encryption, the CBPRNG
will enhance security. Besides, Table 6 lists the χ2 test results for the 100
P-value of each subtest. The three CBPRNGs have P-valueT greater than
0.0001 for all subtests while the results of three coupling maps are not good
because there are many P-valueT smaller than 0.0001. This also indicates
that the sequences generated by CBPRNG are really uniformly distributed,
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which confirms our analysis in Section 4.2.
Table 5: Proportion of NIST SP800-22 test results of various PRNGs
Subtest
Proportion(> 96) *
LSCM-LCG LSCM-III TLCM-LCG TLCM-III STCM-LCG STCM-III
(x0 = 0.4584, r = 0.6541) (x0 = 0.4584, r = 0.0257) (x0 = 0.4584, r = 0.9335)
Frequency 99 0 96 0 96 0
Block Frequency
98 0 99 1 99 56
(m = 128)
Cusum-Forward 99 0 96 0 95 0
Cusum-Reverse 100 0 96 0 96 0
Runs 98 0 100 0 100 0
LongestRun 97 98 99 97 99 99
Rank 99 99 99 100 99 100
FFT 99 95 100 98 100 100
Non Over. Temp.
100 55 98 61 99 83
(m = 9, B = 000000001)
Over. Temp.(m = 9) 100 97 98 98 98 97
Universal 98 82 99 99 99 100
Appr. Entropy
99 0 98 1 98 29
(m = 10)
Ran. Exc.(x = +1) ** 61/62 - 61/61 - 61/61 -
Ran. Exc. Var. **
62/62 - 60/61 - 61/61 -
(x = −1)
Serial(m = 16,∇Ψ2m) 99 0 98 88 98 96
Linear Complexity
99 100 100 98 100 99(M = 500)
Success Count 15/15 4/15 15/15 6/15 15/15 7/15
* Bold font denotes that the PRNG fail the subtest.
** The random excursion (variant) test may be not applicable when there are an insufficient
number of cycles in the test sequence, see [33]. The P-valueT cannot be calculated when the
number of tested sequences are less than 55, denoted by ”-”.
5. Proposed image encryption algorithm
Based on CBPRNG, a novel image encryption algorithm is proposed in
this section. We adopt the classical ”confusion-diffusion” framework [34] to
encrypt digital images. Also, a bit plane flip operation is designed to enhance
security. The confusion and diffusion are based on random sequences gen-
erated by three types of CBPRNG—LSCM-LCG,TLCM-LCG and STCM-
LCG. Figure 9 depicts the process of encryption and structure of keys, in
which LSCM-LCG and TLCM-LCG are used in the process of confusion,
while STCM-LCG is applied in the diffusing stage. The following subsec-
tions illusrate the encryption process.
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Table 6: P-valueT of NIST SP800-22 test results of various PRNGs
Subtest
P-valueT (> 0.0001)
LSCM-LCG LSCM-III TLCM-LCG TLCM-III STCM-LCG STCM-III
(x0 = 0.4584, r = 0.6541) (x0 = 0.4584, r = 0.0257) (x0 = 0.4584, r = 0.9335)
Frequency 0.935716 0.000000 0.383827 0.000000 0.383827 0.000000
Block Frequency
0.236810 0.000000 0.834308 0.000000 0.834308 0.000000
(m = 128)
Cusum-Forward 0.171867 0.000000 0.955835 0.000000 0.955835 0.000000
Cusum-Reverse 0.437274 0.000000 0.494392 0.000000 0.494392 0.000000
Runs 0.759756 0.000000 0.574903 0.000000 0.574903 0.000000
LongestRun 0.419021 0.012650 0.719747 0.494392 0.719747 0.534146
Rank 0.006196 0.202268 0.419021 0.935716 0.419021 0.699313
FFT 0.171867 0.010988 0.595549 0.350485 0.595549 0.102526
Non Over. Temp.
0.816537 0.000000 0.924076 0.000000 0.924076 0.000000
(m = 9, B = 000000001)
Over. Temp.(m = 9) 0.066882 0.000000 0.554420 0.030806 0.554420 0.191687
Universal 0.779188 0.000000 0.137282 0.249284 0.137282 0.911413
Appr. Entropy
0.574903 0.000000 0.514124 0.000000 0.514124 0.000000
(m = 10)
Ran. Exc.(x = +1) 0.739918 - 0.086458 - 0.086458 -
Ran. Exc. Var.
0.862344 - 0.993837 - 0.988549 -
(x = −1)
Serial(m = 16,∇Ψ2m) 0.023545 0.000000 0.554420 0.000000 0.554420 0.000000
Linear Complexity
0.090936 0.262249 0.657933 0.350485 0.657933 0.534146(M = 500)
Success Count 15/15 4/15 15/15 6/15 15/15 6/15
 
Figure 9: The structure of proposed image encryption scheme.
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5.1. Confusion phase
The confusion operation scrambles the original image to broke the high
correlation among adjacent pixels. An effective approach that many existing
algorithms deployed to shuffle the pixels is sorting an unordered random
sequence to an ordered one, then pixels are rearranged according to the
location maps of elements in two sequences [35, 36, 37, 38]. However, the
sorting process is relatively time consuming. In this program, the confusion
is completed by exchanging the position of every pixel with the other one
sequentially, which is inspired by the famous Knuth shuffle algorithm [39].
And the pixel to be exchanged is decided by two random matrix generated
by CBPRNG.
Let P be a digital image matrix with size M × N . Note that if P is a
multichannel color image, just convert it to a gray image by concating differ-
ent channels. Also, we may assume the color depth of images is 8 bits in the
following text. And the other cases have similar encrypting process. For each
pixel P (i, j) in P , its location is exchanged with pixel P (H1(i, j), H2(i, j)),
where H1, H2 are two M×N random matrix obtained from LSCM-LCG and
TLCM-LCG, respectively. The exchanging order is up to down and left to
right, i.e. with the growth of i, j. The confusion operation is described as
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Confusion algorithm
Input: P : Original image matrix of size M ×N
x1, r1, x2, r2: Secrete keys
Output: T : The scrambled image matrix
1: H1 = LSCM− LCG(x1, r1) mod M
2: H2 = TLCM− LCG(x2, r2) mod N
3: T = P
4: for i = 1 to M do
5: for j = 1 to N do
6: Exchange(T (i, j), T (H1(i, j), H2(i, j)))
7: end for
8: end for
5.2. Bit plane flip
The bit plane flip operation (BPF) increases the complexity of encryption
and gets attackers into trouble. Suppose T is the scrambled image matrix,
23
we split T into 8 binary planes T7T6 · · ·T0 by regarding the same bits of each
pixel as a bit plane. Then, every bit plane is flipped according to the parity
of i. When i is even, the plane Ti is flipped up and down; when i is odd, the
plane Ti is flipped left and right. After all the 8 planes are flipped, they are
merged into a new image matrix S. Figure 10 exhibits the process of BPF
operation.
 
Figure 10: Process of BPF operation
5.3. Diffusion phase
In image encryption, it makes sense that a plain image with little change
results a totally different ciphertext image. That is, the encrypted image
should be extremely sensitive to original image, which is crucial in resisting
known-plaintext attack [40] and chosen-plaintext attack [41]. The diffusion
operation is exactly designed to make small changes in plain image spread
through the whole image matrix.
Our diffusion algorithm contains two main steps: forward diffusion (FD)
and reverse diffusion (RD). The reason why we perform two diffusion in op-
posite directions is to increase the stability. That is, wherever the change is
happened in original image, it will affect all other pixels. Besides, a random
sequence participants in the whole process for improving numerical distribu-
tion of cipher image.
In FD phase, we make a pixel influenced by the bit-reverse order (e.g. the
bit-reverse order of 6 = (110)2 is (011)2 = 3) of its previous pixel in cipher.
This process is based on bitwise XOR operation and can be formally defined
as Eq.(11):
Gˆi = Sˆi ⊗ Uˆi ⊗ BitRev(Gˆi−1), (11)
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where Gˆ is the diffused pixel sequence, Sˆ is the bit-plane-flipped image pixel
sequence, Uˆ is a random sequence generated by STCM-LCG, and BitRev(x)
denotes the bit-reverse order of x.
In RD phase, we employ the modulo operation to make each pixel affected
by its succeeding pixel in cipher. The random sequence is still joined by
bitwise XOR operation. The RD procedure is defined by Eq.(12):
Qˆi = ((Gˆi + Qˆi+1) mod 256)⊗ Uˆi+MN , (12)
where Qˆ is the pixel sequence of the final cipher image and we set QˆMN+1 =
Gˆ1 initially. Algorithm 2 describes the diffusion operation.
Algorithm 2 Diffusion algorithm
Input: S: The bit-plane-flipped image matrix of size M ×N
x3, r3: Secrete keys
Output: Q: The finally Encrypted image matrix
1: Sˆ = reshape(S,MN, 1)
2: U = STCM− LCG(x3, r3, 2MN, 1) mod 256
3: Gˆ1 = Sˆ1 ⊗ Uˆ1
4: for i = 2 to MN do
5: Gˆi = Sˆi ⊗ Uˆi ⊗ BitRev(Gˆi−1)
6: end for
7: QˆMN = ((GˆMN + Gˆ1) mod 256)⊗ Uˆ2MN
8: for i = MN − 1 to 1 do
9: Qˆi = ((Gˆi + Qˆi+1) mod 256)⊗ Uˆi+MN
10: end for
11: Q = reshape(Qˆ,M,N)
6. Security analysis of proposed image encryption algorithm
To test the performance of our proposed encryption scheme, we implement
the encryption-decryption process in MATLAB R2018b, where the hardware
parameters of the computer are Intel Core i7-4710MQ CPU and 16GB RAM.
The plaintext images that we choose for test are six images of size 256×256.
The four grayscale images are Lena, Cameraman, Peppers, and Starfish,
while the two color images are Airplane and Baboon. We evaluate the secu-
rity of our proposed algorithm from multiple aspects and compare the results
with existing methods, which demonstrates the effectiveness and the progress
of the proposed image encryption scheme.
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6.1. Histogram analysis
Histogram of a digital image shows the distribution of gray value of all
pixels. A meaningful image will show obvious characteristic in its histogram
that the number of pixels with the same gray value takes a specific per-
centage. Thus, an ideal cipher image should have an uniform distributed
histogram that will never leak any meaningful information to attackers who
use statistical attacks.
The histograms of four grayscales and their corresponding ciphers are
shown as Figure 11. The histograms of plaintext images present remarkable
features as seen in Figure 11(a)-11(d). After encryption, all the images be-
come indistinguishable noise-like ciphers. We can never tell the difference
among Figure 11(i)-11(l) visually. And the histograms of four ciphertext im-
ages become identical. All 256 gray levels appear with the same probability
in encrypted images. This will invalidate the statistical attacks based on
pixel value frequency.
Figure 12 illustrates the histogram of two color images as well as their
ciphers. As seen in Figure 12, all the three channels of color images exhibit
characteristics in their histograms. After encryption, the pixels in all three
channels are evenly distributed, as shown in Figure 12(f)-12(h) and 12(n)-
12(p). Therefore, The proposed algorithm is also applicable for color images.
The histograms presents the distribution of pixels intuitively. In order to
quantitatively examine whether the distribution of pixels in cipher is exact
uniform, a χ2-test is performed on encrypted images [42]. For a 8-bit M ×N
grayscale with the hypothesis of uniform distribution, the test statistic is
calculated as:
χ2 =
255∑
i=0
(fi − fe)2
fe
, (13)
where fe = MN/256, fi is the occurrence frequency of gray level i in image.
χ2 has a χ2 distribution of 255 degrees of freedom.
Set the significant level as α = 0.05, then we may accept the hypothesis if
χ2 < χ20.05(255) = 293.2478. Otherwise we reject the hypothesis. The χ
2-test
values of six images as well as their ciphers are listed as Table 7. As we can
see, The plaintext images have χ2 values far larger than χ20.05(255) while all
the ciphers have χ2 values less than 293.2478. That is, all ciphertext images
pass the test and we can confidently conclude the pixels in encrypted images
are evenly distributed.
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Figure 11: Histogram analysis: (a) Lena; (b) Cameraman; (c) Peppers; (d) Starfish;
(e) Histogram of (a); (f) Histogram of (b); (g) Histogram of (c); (h) Histogram of (d);
(i) Encrypted Lena; (j) Encrypted Cameraman; (k) Encrypted Peppers; (l) Encrypted
Starfish; (m) Histogram of (i); (n) Histogram of (j); (o) Histogram of (k); (p) Histogram
of (l);
27
(a)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 50 100 150 200 250
(b)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0 50 100 150 200 250
(c)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 50 100 150 200 250
(d)
(e)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 50 100 150 200 250
(f)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 50 100 150 200 250
(g)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 50 100 150 200 250
(h)
(i)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 50 100 150 200 250
(j)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 50 100 150 200 250
(k)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 50 100 150 200 250
(l)
(m)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 50 100 150 200 250
(n)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 50 100 150 200 250
(o)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 50 100 150 200 250
(p)
Figure 12: Histogram analysis: (a) Airplane; (b) Histogram of R channel of (a); (c)
Histogram of G channel of (a); (d) Histogram of B channel of (a); (e) Encrypted Airplane;
(f) Histogram of R channel of (e); (g) Histogram of G channel of (e); (h) Histogram of B
channel of (e); (i) Baboo; (j) Histogram of R channel of (i); (k) Histogram of G channel of
(i); (l) Histogram of B channel of (i); (m) Encrypted Baboo; (n) Histogram of R channel
of (m); (o) Histogram of G channel of (m); (p) Histogram of B channel of (m);
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Table 7: χ2 test for original images and encrypted images
Image Lena Cameraman Peppers Starfish
Original image 11097 29979 36778 16292
Encrypted image 267.57 250.41 210.09 256.22
Image Airplane Baboon
Channels R G B R G B
Original image 15362 15059 25618 23763 35738 20450
Encrypted image 280.55 233.14 258.70 279.74 253.49 212.15
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Figure 13: MSEs between decrypted image and original image with the subtle change α
on various keys
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6.2. Key space and key sensitivity
Key space size is the total number of the different key groups that can
be used in encryption. The key space should be large enough to resist the
brute-force attack. Key sensitivity tells us how slightly a key changes will
make difference to the encryption system. In our proposed algorithm, the
secret keys include x1, r1 x2, r2, x3, r3. The range of these keys are (0, 1).
In order to test the sensitivities of these keys, one common approach is
to decrypt cipher image with a key slightly changed by α (i.e. change x1 to
x1 + α). Then we adjust the change intensity α until we decrypt the correct
plaintext image. We use mean square error (MSE) to assess the difference
between decrypted image and original image with the variety of α. The MSE
of two M ×N images F1, F2 is defined as:
MSE =
1
MN
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(F1 (i, j)− F2 (i, j))2 (14)
MSE = 0 means that the two images are exactly the same. Considering
that the secret keys in our proposed encryption scheme are mutual indepen-
dent, we can test the key sensitivity by changing one key and leave others
unchanged.
The α-MSE plots of six keys are shown as Figure 13. Form these diagrams
we obtain the sensitivities of secrete key listed as Table 8. Since the typical
value of smallest computational precision is 2−52 according to IEEE floating-
point standard [43], the total number of different value for each key above is
more than 252 as it is sensitive enough. Therefore, the key space size of the
proposed encryption scheme is more than 252×6 = 2312, which is completely
enough to resist all kinds of brute-force attack.
Table 8: Sensitivities of secret keys
Keys x1 r1 x2 r2 x3 r3
Sensitivity 2−55 2−56 2−53 2−54 2−54 2−54
6.3. Resistance to differential attack
By constructing special plain image to encrypt and find the correspon-
dence among pixels, the chosen plaintext attack is a powerful attack tech-
nique. However, most chosen plaintext attack will be useless faced with
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our proposed encryption algorithm since we will get totally different cipher
images once the plaintext image changes slightly. When we say ”totally dif-
ferent”, we tend to use the Number of Pixel Change Rate (NPCR) and the
Unified Average Changing Intensity (UACI) to measure the difference be-
tween two images. Let F1 (i, j) and F2 (i, j) be the (i, j) th pixel of two image
F1 and F2 with size M ×N ,respectively, the definitions of NPCR and UACI
are as follows [44]:
NPCR =
∑
i,j D (i, j)
MN
× 100%, (15)
where D (i, j) is defined as
D (i, j) =
{
0, F1 (i, j) = F2 (i, j) ,
1, F1 (i, j) 6= F2 (i, j) ,
(16)
UACI =
1
MN
∑
i,j
|F1 (i, j)− F2 (i, j) |
L− 1 × 100%, (17)
where L denotes the largest supported gray value compatible with the image
format.
For 8-bit grayscale images, it has been proved that the expect values of
NPCR and UACI between two random image (each pixel takes a random
number independently) are 99.6094% and 33.4635%, respectively [44].
In the test, We change only one bit in plain image and encrypt the two
images with the same keys. Then NPCR and UACI value between two ci-
pher images are calculated by Eq.(15)-(17). Of course, we have to do the
experiments for many times and take the average value as the ultimate re-
sult. The results of sensitivity test for six images and the theoretical values
defined by the 0.1%, 1% and 5% confidence intervals are listed as Table 9
and Table 10. As we can see from the above table, NPCR and UACI are
close to their expected values, which has proved that we will get a totally
different cipher image every time we encrypt the same plain image with one-
bit-change. Thus, our proposed algorithm has achieved high resistance to all
kinds of differential attack.
Moreover, for Lena iamge, Table 11 and Table 12 list the NPCR and
UACI results of some existing image encryption algorithms. It can be seen
that our proposed method passes all the test while some existing methods
fail some items. Thus, the proposed scheme exhibits excellent performance
by comparison, which proves the progress of this work.
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Table 9: NPCR test results of the proposed image encryption algorithm
Image NPCR NPCR critical values
NPCR∗0.05 = 99.5693% NPCR
∗
0.01 = 99.5527% NPCR
∗
0.001 = 99.5341%
Lena 99.6964% Passed Passed Passed
Cameraman 99.6002% Passed Passed Passed
Peppers 99.6063% Passed Passed Passed
Starfish 99.6351% Passed Passed Passed
Airplane 99.6228% Passed Passed Passed
Baboon 99.6191% Passed Passed Passed
Table 10: UACI test results of the proposed image encryption algorithm
Image UACI UACI critical values
UACI∗−0.05 = 33.2824%
UACI∗+0.05 = 33.6447%
UACI∗−0.01 = 33.2255%
UACI∗+0.01 = 33.7016%
UACI∗−0.001 = 33.1594%
UACI∗+0.001 = 33.7677%
Lena 33.4758% Passed Passed Passed
Cameraman 33.5031% Passed Passed Passed
Peppers 33.4523% Passed Passed Passed
Starfish 33.4875% Passed Passed Passed
Airplane 33.5115% Passed Passed Passed
Baboon 33.4624% Passed Passed Passed
Table 11: NPCR test results of different image encryption algorithms
Algorithm NPCR NPCR critical values
NPCR∗0.05 = 99.5693% NPCR
∗
0.01 = 99.5527% NPCR
∗
0.001 = 99.5341%
Proposed 99.6964% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[23] 99.6191% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[45] 99.6096% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[25] 99.620% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[46] 99.5865% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[47] 99.61% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[48] 99.62% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[49] 99.61% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[7] 99.6689% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[50] 99.36% Failed Failed Failed
Table 12: UACI test results of different image encryption algorithms
Image UACI UACI critical values
UACI∗−0.05 = 33.2824%
UACI∗+0.05 = 33.6447%
UACI∗−0.01 = 33.2255%
UACI∗+0.01 = 33.7016%
UACI∗−0.001 = 33.1594%
UACI∗+0.001 = 33.7677%
Proposed 33.4758% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[23] 33.6751% Failed Passed Passed
Ref.[45] 33.4283% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[25] 33.505% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[46] 33.2533% Failed Passed Passed
Ref.[47] 33.13% Failed Failed Failed
Ref.[48] 33.51% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[49] 33.33% Failed Passed Passed
Ref.[7] 33.4936% Passed Passed Passed
Ref.[50] 32.72% Failed Failed Failed
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6.4. Correlation analysis
A meaningful image has high correlation among adjacent pixels. Thus
an important feature for image encryption algorithm is to break this high
correlation and make it possible to resist all kinds of statistical attack. To
test correlation of image, we randomly select 5000 pairs of adjacent pixels
from three different directions (horizontal, vertical and diagonal) in plaintext
images and ciphertext images, and calculate the correlation coefficient by:
CC =
∑N
i=1 (xi − x¯) (yi − y¯)√(∑N
i=1 (xi − x¯)2
)(∑N
i=1 (yi − y¯)2
) , (18)
where x¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi, y¯ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 yi. The result is listed in Table.13. As
we can see, the plain images hold the correlation coefficient close to 1 in
all direction, which demonstrates high correlation. After encryption, the
correlation coefficient is close to 0. That is, our proposed algorithm has
broken the correlation between adjacent pixels. The distribution of gray
values in Lena for two adjacent pixels is shown in Figure.14, which has proved
the conclusion above visually. Besides, Table 14 presents the correlation
coefficients of encrypted Lena using different encryption algorithms. It can
be seen that the proposed encryption scheme gets relatively favorable results
among these methods.
Table 13: Correlation coefficients
Image
Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
plain-image cipher-image plain-image cipher-image plain-image cipher-image
Lena 0.973187 0.001135 0.960615 0.002457 0.945709 0.003213
Cameraman 0.807831 0.001258 0.842404 0.007285 0.802359 0.003244
Peppers 0.923041 0.002659 0.921635 0.004842 0.910057 0.002405
Starfish 0.963034 0.001167 0.963555 0.008413 0.942439 0.000175
Woman 0.882540 0.002617 0.893154 0.008413 0.884573 0.003216
Baboon 0.935587 0.003578 0.942316 0.000311 0.939928 0.006542
6.5. Robustness to data loss
In actual communication system, some information of the encrypted im-
age may be lost when it is transmitted in channel for all kinds of reasons.
And attackers may intercept the information and cause data loss as well.
Then receivers would like to recover the original image as much as possible
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Figure 14: Adjacent pixel correlation in different directions: (a) Horizontal direction of
Lena; (b) Vertical direction of Lena; (c) Diagonal direction of Lena; (d) Horizontal direc-
tion of Encrypted Lena; (e) Vertical direction of Encrypted Lena; (f) Diagonal direction
of Encrypted Lena;
Table 14: Correlation coefficients of various algorithms
Algorithm Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Proposed 0.001135 0.002457 0.003213
Ref.[47] -0.0331 0.0057 0.0169
Ref.[10] 0.0015 0.0017 -0.0033
Ref.[3] 0.0127 -0.0190 -0.0012
Ref.[23] -0.00222 0.00137 0.00291
Ref.[45] 0.01410 0.02960 0.00540
Ref.[25] -0.0017 -0.0084 -0.0019
Ref.[42] -0.009448 0.024064 -0.041171
Ref.[9] -0.003280 -0.000777 -0.000181
Ref.[48] -0.0230 0.0019 -0.0034
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from the partial information received in such situation. Thus it is useful if
the encryption algorithm shows robustness to data loss.
In our experiment, we let the encrypted Lena lose 25% and 50% infor-
mation in different pixels, respectively, and decrypt them with correct keys.
The result is shown in Figure.15. As we can see, the decrypted images have
restored most of the original information visually, which has proved the ro-
bustness to data loss of our proposed encryption scheme.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 15: Data loss analysis: (a) 25% data loss of encrypted Lena; (a) 25% data loss
of encrypted Lena; (c) 50% data loss of encrypted Lena; (d) 50% data loss of encrypted
Lena; (e) decrypted Lena from (a); (f) decrypted Lena from (b); (g) decrypted Lena from
(c); (h) decrypted Lena from (d).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a novel chaotic system named as UT-CCS is proposed as a
general chaotic framework that covers several existing chaotification models.
The UT-CCS can generate new chaotic maps with excellent performance us-
ing any two existing chaotic maps. A theorem leading us to choose better
UTFs, is given and proved. Several new chaotic maps are generated as exam-
ples and the results of chaotic behavior analysis demonstrate the superiority
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of UT-CCS. Besides, a new PRNG based on generated chaotic maps is de-
signed for image encryption, of which the uniformity of numerical distribution
is also proved mathematically. At last, a digital image encryption algorithm
based on CBPRNG is proposed. The confusion phase and diffusion phase
of the encryption scheme are based on different CBPRNG to achieve better
randomness. We implement the algorithm in simulation environment and
analyze the security through general tests. The results indicates the reliabil-
ity of ciphertext images and the competitiveness of our algorithm compared
with similar methods.
This paper makes contributions to chaos application and image informa-
tion security. In future work, we will continue improving our model such as
extending the UT-CCS to two-dimensional case.
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